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making on state purchasing. Although there is considerable agreement on ends (efficient, non-corrupt, and 
transparent public purchasing systems), little information is available on means and, in particular, on the 
effective and replicable strategies that developing countries can adopt to improve their public 
procurement systems. A concerted effort to substantially add to the knowledge base on public 
procurement reforms in developing countries, through targeted research and international exchange of 
information on implemented procurement policies and outcomes, is critical to identifying areas where 
further binding multilateral disciplines may be beneficial.  
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In the July 2004 package, agreed by the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) General 
Council, it was decided not to launch negotiations on new multilateral rules on 
transparency in government procurement and, for that matter, on two of the other so-
called Singapore Issues (competition and investment policies). In recent years scholarship 
and commentary has assessed the merits of such negotiations, the causes and likely 
consequences of the collapse of the 2003 meeting of WTO Ministers in Cancun, and the 
pre-requisites for and likelihood of reinvigorating the Doha Round. This paper will not 
revisit these issues. Suffice it to say that the views of analysts, governments, and 
stakeholders differ substantially. The “breathing space” created by the July 2004 package 
provides an opportunity to re-evaluate the adequacy of the evidentiary base upon which 
trade negotiators, policymakers, and others can draw upon when devising and evaluating 
proposals for new international trade rules.  
Evidence matters for at least four reasons. First, a focus on evidence and on the 
factual record grounds discussions of proposed rules in actual national experience and not 
on theoretically-inspired “first principles” (be they legal or economic) or on “best 
practices” whose universal validity is rarely established. Second, a thorough 
understanding of the relevant magnitudes involved often casts the alleged priorities for 
multilateral rule making in a different light. Third, proposed rules can be evaluated as to 
whether they prevent a WTO member from replicating an effective reform (or 
development) strategy that was pursued by another nation. Fourth and related to this, 
information is needed on the complementary actions and policies that may need to be 
implemented so as to ensure that proposed procurement reforms actually benefit the 
country concerned. In a round of trade negotiations that purports to be pro-development 
the latter reasons are especially relevant. 
In this paper we take one of the Singapore Issues—transparency in government 
procurement—and describe what is known about the size of developing country   3
procurement markets and the trajectories and consequences of procurement reform.
4 
While there is some publicly available information on procurement practices in 
developing countries, we argue there is not sufficient evidence as to the means by which 
successful public procurement reform can be implemented.
5 This in turn makes it 
difficult to formulate and defend proposals for new multilateral rules in this area. This is 
not to say that improving transparency is unimportant for public procurement 
processes—but is it necessarily a priority for developing countries? Did nations that 
successfully reformed their public procurement practices start by improving transparency 
or were other steps taken first? Indeed, were measures to improve transparency 
contingent on other reforms being in place? The case for further multilateral rules on 
transparency in government procurement will depend, in part, on the answers to these 
questions. 
To date, a convincing, evidence-based case for the incorporation of further 
binding disciplines in the WTO has not been made. This reflects a lack of analysis and 
information on the ‘return on investment’ to alternative types of procurement reforms, the 
role that international disciplines can and should play, and how such disciplines need to 
be complemented by national actions to ensure positive payoffs. Compiling such 
evidence requires the pursuit of a research program to shed light on the success or 
otherwise of public procurement policies in a range of developing countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Some of the reasons for the increased attention 
given to public procurement laws and practices in developing countries are discussed in 
the next section. Section III turns to the factual record on the size of procurement markets 
in developing economies. Section IV summarizes the findings of the literature on the 
effects of public procurement reforms, and highlights some of the weaknesses therein. 
Section V describes two approaches that could go a considerable way to narrowing the 
                                                 
4 In Evenett and Hoekman (2003) we defined a procurement regime to be transparent if the terms upon 
which the procurement process is conducted and the criteria on which decisions will be based are properly 
documented and made widely available; the award decision is made publicly available and motivated; and 
it is possible to verify that the documented procedures and criteria were applied. 
5 This contrasts to the considerable literature on procurement in the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. See e.g., Arrowsmith and Davies (1998), Arrowsmith and 
Trybus (2003) and Arrowsmith, Linarelli, and Wallace (2000). A website created by Professor Steven 
Schooner at http://www.law.gwu.edu/facweb/sschooner/links.html provides an extensive list of links to 
information on the web devoted to public procurement.   4
existing knowledge gaps identified in prior sections of this paper. Concluding remarks 
are presented in section VI. 
II.  The growing importance of developing country procurement practices 
Procurement policies are important from a development perspective. Reducing poverty 
and attaining health, education, and other objectives requires getting the most out of the 
limited funds available for state purchases of goods, services, and infrastructure. Efficient 
public procurement practices also contribute towards the sound management of public 
expenditures more generally (Hunja 2003). Procurement planning enables the 
identification of major investment expenditures, which in turn facilitates budgetary 
decision-making. In addition, the effective provision of public services often requires the 
coordinated delivery of materials and the like, which the state purchasing apparatus must 
accomplish. It is difficult to imagine how a state can deliver substantial improvements in 
the well being for its citizens without a public expenditure system that includes effective 
public procurement policies. This recognition accounts in part for the growing interest in 
public procurement laws and practices and in the feasibility and likely consequences of 
their reform. 
  There is also a growing appreciation of the linkages between specific national 
objectives and public procurement practices. For example, state contracting is often a 
central focus of campaigns to tackle corruption and to ensure that appropriate distance is 
kept between government officials and the private sector. Procurement policies may be 
part of an industrial policy or an instrument to attain social objectives (e.g., support for 
small and medium sized enterprises, minority-owned businesses, disadvantaged ethnic 
groups, or certain geographic regions) through set-asides and preference policies. The 
manner in which a state implements its public procurement policies has implications for 
the achievement of such objectives, and for the cost of doing so. Indeed, these policies 
may speak volumes about numerous other national priorities, practices, and concerns 
(McCrudden 2004). Knowing what the various objectives are and how effective and 
efficient procurement policies are in attaining them should be an important dimension of 
assessing the performance of governments.    5
Another reason why procurement issues are attracting increasing attention is that 
they may condition access to foreign markets. International trade negotiations—whether 
bilateral, regional, or multilateral—are a mechanism through which governments address 
the terms upon which foreign firms can compete in domestic public procurement 
markets. WTO disciplines on procurement are currently voluntary, in that they apply only 
to signatories of a so-called plurilateral agreement, the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA). Most developing countries have not joined the GPA, although they 
have been encouraged to do so by OECD countries. Procurement has also been the 
subject of negotiated disciplines in numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements, 
examples being the various treaties associated with the European Community and its 
successor the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and recent agreements between the US and EU on the one hand and partner countries 
(industrialized and developing) on the other.  
Given the growing prominence of public procurement law and practices in 
developing countries the question immediately raises as to what evidence and national 
experience is available to inform reform strategies and international rule making. As a 
first step in considering the evidentiary base on public procurement practices in 
developing countries it is useful to assess the available data on the size of public 
procurement markets, which is the subject of the next section. 
III.  Establishing the factual record: public procurement in developing countries 
Data on total government expenditure levels, in particular on central government outlays, 
include certain payments (such as compensation for government employees) that are not 
usually the subject of state contracts with private sector firms or other suppliers. There 
have been a few attempts to strip out such payments from total government spending 
levels, so as to provide a more accurate guide of the amount of public outlays that might 
be influenced by state procurement laws and practices. The latest comprehensive study is 
OECD (2002a) which employs the System of National Accounts (SNA) to compute the 
magnitude of procurement of goods and services by state bodies in 106 developing   6
countries in 1998
6. In addition to stripping out expenditures on salaries and wages of state 
employees, this study differentiates between current government expenditures and capital 
expenditures. The estimates of the size of the procurement markets are reported (as a 






































Figure 1 plots the distribution (from smallest to largest) of the computed size of 
government procurement outlays for the 106 developing economies. The skewed nature 
of this distribution is clear: in 1998 about half of the developing countries covered in this 
OECD study had state procurement outlays less than or equal to $1 billion. Only six 
developing countries had state procurement markets
7 whose total size exceeded $10 
billion. Table 1 makes clear just how few of the developing countries have public 
procurement markets that are of any magnitude. This finding raises the question whether 
there could be a large payoff to OECD firms in improved “market access” to developing 
countries’ state procurement markets.
8 
                                                 
6 For the purposes of the figure 1 and table 1 reported here a country that is not an OECD member is taken 
to be a developing country. Separately, it is worth noting that the OECD (2002a) study also reports data on 
the size of procurement markets in the OECD nations. 
7 See the “FCE excluding compensation and defence” line in Figure 1.  
8 The size of public procurement spending on goods and services may understate the total trade impact of 
procurement rules. For example, local content requirements for inputs may imply that transactions that do 
not directly involve a state agency can be influenced by public procurement policies. More generally,   7
 
Table 1: Non-OECD procurement markets exceeding US$5 billion, 1998. 
More than US$5 billion and less than US$10 billion: 
Egypt, Morocco, Chile, Peru, Puerto Rica, Bangladesh, India, Israel, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Syria, United Arab Emirates. 
More than US$10 billion: 
South Africa, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Russia. 
Source: OECD (2002a). 
 
Taking all of these 106 developing countries together, this OECD study found 
that government purchases of goods and services in these economies accounted for 
approximately 5.1 percent of their combined national outputs. (The comparable figure for 
the OECD member states was 7.9 percent.) The 106 developing countries’ procurement 
markets amounted to only 13.9 percent of the total worldwide procurement spending in 
1998. 
The share of total procurement outlays available to international competition is a 
function of many variables. These include the share of government services that are 
‘contracted out’ to the private sector, the size distribution of contracts (smaller contracts 
tend not to be attractive to foreign firms), the size of central government as compared to 
local or municipal governments, and the share of expenditures financed through 
development assistance funds that are tied to sourcing of goods and services from the 
donor country, etc. Available data on the relative importance of aid flows as a share of 
government expenditure suggest that aid finances a significant share of total purchases of 
goods and services by developing country governments.  The ratio of official aid flows 
(bi- and multilateral) to total expenditure was equivalent to 35 percent of total 
expenditures on goods and services for low-income countries in the early 1990s. For 
lower middle-income nations, total aid accounted for 16 percent of expenditures; for 
upper middle-income economies the figure dropped to 6 percent (Hoekman, 1998). 
It is worth noting that very few developing country discriminatory state 
procurement practices against foreign firms appear to have been the subject of complaints 
                                                                                                                                                 
Evenett and Hoekman (2005) analyze the conditions under which procurement policies affect market 
access.   8
by trade ministries in industrialized countries. Table 2 lists the United States’ trading 
partners that have been cited in annual reports devoted to assessing discriminatory 
foreign procurement practices. No least developed countries (LDCs) are listed in table 2; 
only a few of the larger developing countries appear to attract the attention of the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR)—although one must be open to the possibility that 
the USTR used the (unfulfilled) threat of “naming” a country in these reports to induce 
changes in other countries’ procurement practices. Even so, there appears little to suggest 
that the state procurement markets of much of the developing world are large enough to 
attract much attention from the trade officials in leading industrialized countries. 
Table 2: Public procurement practices of countries cited as concerns in USTR 
annual reports on discriminatory trade practices 






“Identified” cases of 
discrimination. 
“Issues of Particular Concern That Do Not Meet the 
Criteria for Identification.” 
1992. European  Union: 
government-owned 
telecommunications in 




Germany: Heavy electrical 
equipment. 
Japan: Public works. 
Japan: Supercomputers. 
Japan: Computers. 
Australia: Pre-selection criteria for bidders. 
Brazil: Expanded discriminatory procedures in 1994. 




None.  Korea: Construction of Inchon International Airport. 
Japan: Computer products and services. 




None.  Japan: Public works. 
Taiwan (China): General procurement procedures. 
Canada: Provincial price preferences. 
Mexico: Implementation of New Procurement Laws 
and NAFTA-related tendering periods. 
Korea: Airport construction. 
Germany: “Sect Filters” (to ensure that the principles 




None.  None in addition to prior years. 
Source: Website of the Office of the United States’ Trade Representative.   9
Turning to actual
9 procurement laws and their implementation, a small literature 
has emerged on public procurement practices in developing countries. Table 3 provides a 
listing of recent studies. 
Table 3: List of recent literature on specific instances of public procurement reform 





Literature (for full citations see the references at 




1.  Bangladesh  Lovei and McKechnie (2000)  Yes 
2.  Botswana Lionjanga  (2003)   
3.  Bhutan Trepte  (1998)  Yes 
4.  Brazil  Levy (2001), OECD (2003) (citing Business News 
America 2002), and Ozorio de Almeida (2004) 
 
5.  Chile  Orrego-Urzua, Osorio, and Mardones (2001)   
6.  China  Cao (2003), Tian (2001, 2003), Liu (2004), 
Rothery (2003) 
 
7.  Columbia USAID  (1999)   
8.  Czech Republic  Mardas and Varsakelis (2000)   
9.  Estonia  Annikve (1998), Lamvol (2002)   
10.  Ecuador Moncayo  (2004)   
11.  Guatemala USAID  (1999)   
12.  Ghana  Verhage et. al. (2002)   
13.  Hungary Mardas  (2001)   
14.  India  Srivastava (1999), Khorana (2002), and Das 
(2004) 
 
15.  Kenya Obiri  (2003)   
16.  Korea  Choi (1999), Seong and Lee (2004)   
17.  Kosovo Piselli  (2003)   
18.  Laos Trepte  (1998)  Yes 
19.  Nicaragua   Cohen (n.d.)   
20.  Nigeria  Ekpenkhio (2003), Onyekpere (2005).   
21.  Pakistan  Transparency International (2002)   
22.  Poland  Glebocki (2000), Piasta (2000), and Lemke (2003)   
23.  South Africa  Wittig (1999), Caron (2002), Watermeyer (2004)   
24.  Tanzania Nkingu  (2003)  Yes 
25.  Uganda  Wittig (1999), Agaba (2003)   
Notes: This list is based on a search of (i) the websites of the World Bank, OECD, the International Trade 
Centre, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, and the WTO; (ii) the Social Science 
Research Network database, and (iii) the tables of contents of the leading public procurement journals, 
including the Public Procurement Law Review and the Journal of Public Procurement, and (iv) recent 
conferences on public procurement reform in developing countries. This list focuses on the writings of 
individuals and excludes documents produced by official bodies or reports of international organizations.
10  
                                                 
9 We are well aware that there is a growing literature of theoretical analyses of public procurement matters 
and indeed have surveyed such literature in other papers. Here our focus is on studies of actual procurement 
regimes and procurement reforms in developing countries. 
10 Additional official sources of information on procurement practices include WTO Trade Policy Reviews, 
especially for members of the GPA at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm; submissions to   10
Even though the 41 articles reported in Table 3 surely do not constitute the entire 
literature, it is notable that only four focus on the experiences least developed countries. 
Few studies attempt cross-country comparisons of reform experiences or procurement 
practices—exceptions being Trepte (1998) for Bhutan and Laos and Wittig (1999) for 
South Africa and Uganda. Moreover, only a few of the articles
11 attempt any form of 
quantification of the costs, benefits, or effects of existing procurement practices or reform 
proposals. 
  Another source of information are the Country Procurement Assessment Reports 
prepared by the World Bank and other development agencies. These reports provide a 
diagnostic assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the procurement systems in 
individual developing countries.
12 The CPARs that are publicly available are listed in 
Appendix 2 of this document. The CPAR process has led to recommendations and 
financing of action plans to modernize or reform existing procurement systems in a 
number of countries. As is true of the more academic literature, the impact of this work 
on the performance of national public procurement systems has not been well 
documented, in the sense that the CPARs tend to focus primarily on legal compliance – 
whether laws and required procedures have been implemented. There is little focus on 
quantifying performance, the actual return to having applied processes aimed at 
enhancing competition, transparency and combating the scope for corruption, or the 
expected return to adopting new procedures that have such outcomes as objectives.  
The only cross-country data that is available on the procurement ‘performance’ of 
countries are international surveys. An example is the survey of perceptions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
the WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement Practices, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gproc_e.htm; the World Bank’s Country Procurement 
Assessment Reports (not all of which are publicly available); and Individual Action Plans of APEC 
members, at http://www.apec-iap.org/.  
11 See, for example, Mardas and Varsakelis (2000), Srivastava (1999), Khorana (2002), and Choi (1999). 
Interestingly, most of these refer to the trade policy-related aspects of procurement reforms—suggesting 
that empirical analyses of domestic procurement practices are rather thin on the ground. 
12 A CPAR it will typically include an assessment of the legal and regulatory framework for procurement, 
actual procedures and practices; independent auditing and existence and effectiveness of anti-corruption 
measures, and procurement performance – whether required procedures are known to participants, are 
applied, the length of time it takes to complete a transaction, etc. They are typically done jointly with the 
government and the World Bank, and may also involve a regional development bank (such as the Asian 
Development Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank. See 
http://worldbank.org/html/opr/procure/cpar.htm.    11
government procurement practices conducted by the World Economic Forum and 
reported annually in the Global Competitiveness Report. Table 4 presents the average 
responses (scored on a scale from one to seven) of business people to five questions 
about public procurement policies in 46 developing countries in 2001.
13 (The five 
questions are stated at the top of table 4.) For each of the five questions posed, business 
people perceive that 10 developing countries fall below the respective 46-country sample 
average; suggesting that these 10 countries are seen to have poor procurement practices 
across-the-board. The perception that state officials “favor well connected firms and 
individuals” is strong in Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Zimbabwe (all of which score less than two on a scale of one to seven.) 
Furthermore, “irregular extra payments or bribes connected with public 
contracts/investment  projects” appear to be more prevalent in Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Nigeria, Paraguay, the Ukraine, and Zimbabwe (all of which score less than three) than 
elsewhere.  
While only suggestive, the survey responses reveal there is considerable variation 
in the perceived even-handedness of procurement practices across countries.
14 This in 
turn may have implications for domestic and foreign firms’ investment decisions. 
Unfortunately, no information can be distilled from such surveys regarding the extent to 
which differences in underlying procurement laws and their implementation affect these 
aggregate perceptions, or how responsive the latter are to reforms. To the best of our 
knowledge, no one has attempted to answer this empirical question. The paucity of 
quantitative, cross-country analyses of national procurement practices is striking. 
                                                 
13 For comparison purposes, the mean values of responses in the OECD nations are also reported. 
14 These survey responses have been criticised as subjective, as potentially biased by different cultural 
norms, and by the fact that few business people are familiar with the procurement policies in many 
jurisdictions—so raising the question as to how the survey’s compilers aggregate across the many 
respondents’ answers when producing summary statistics for a sample of dozens of countries. Yet the 
reported “average” survey responses are being used more and more often in public discussions and now 
form part of the empirical (if not factual!) record on national procurement regimes.   12
 
Non-OECD economy 
The composition of 
government spending 
in your country (1=is 
wasteful, 7=provides 
necessary goods and 
services not provided 
by the market)
Government decisions 
on the procurement of 
advanced technology 





When deciding upon 
policies and contracts, 
government officials 
(1=usually favor well-
connected firms and 
individuals, 7=are 
neutral among firms 
and individuals)
New governments 
honor the contractual 
commitments and 
obligations of previous 
regimes (1=not true, 
7=true)
How commonly do 
firms in your industry 
give irregular extra 
payments or bribes 




Argentina  2.2 2.9 2.7  5.0 3.1
Bangladesh  2.7 3.0 2.1  4.1 2.1
Bolivia  2.5 2.4 1.9  2.9 2.8
Brazil  2.7 3.9 3.0  4.2 4.0
Bulgaria  3.2 3.5 2.8  4.3 4.4
Chile  3.9 3.8 4.0  5.3 5.3
China  3.3 4.6 3.4  5.1 3.9
Colombia  2.3 3.4 2.3  3.9 3.7
Costa Rica  2.9 3.8 3.3  4.5 4.2
Dominican Republic  2.7 3.4 1.9  3.2 3.9
Ecuador  2.0 2.6 1.9  3.3 3.2
Egypt  3.9 3.6 3.8  4.9 4.4
El Salvador  3.5 3.1 2.8  4.0 3.7
Estonia  3.6 4.5 3.3  4.8 4.4
Guatemala  2.2 2.7 1.7  2.2 3.1
Honduras  2.2 2.4 1.8  3.6 3.2
Hong Kong SAR  5.5 4.4 4.5  6.3 6.1
India  3.2 3.8 3.4  5.1 3.4
Indonesia  3.1 4.0 2.6  3.8 3.0
Israel  3.7 4.5 4.1  6.1 5.9
Jamaica  3.2 3.9 2.6  4.6 4.4
Jordan  4.3 3.9 3.8  5.4 4.8
Latvia  3.2 4.0 2.9  3.7 3.8
Lithuania  2.6 3.4 3.3  3.5 5.7
Malaysia  4.2 4.4 3.0  4.6 3.5
Mauritius  4.1 3.4 3.4  5.4 3.4
Nicaragua  2.3 3.1 2.2  3.2 3.2
Nigeria  2.7 3.7 2.0  3.7 2.3
Panama  3.2 3.3 2.3  3.7 3.4
Paraguay  1.7 2.7 2.6  2.9 2.6
Table 4: Business people's perceptions of procurement practices in developing countries, 2001  13
Non-OECD economy
The composition of 
government spending 
in your country (1=is 
wasteful, 7=provides 
necessary goods and 
services not provided 
by the market)
Government decisions 
on the procurement of 
advanced technology 





When deciding upon 
policies and contracts, 
government officials 
(1=usually favor well-
connected firms and 
individuals, 7=are 
neutral among firms 
and individuals)
New governments 
honor the contractual 
commitments and 
obligations of previous 
regimes (1=not true, 
7=true)
How commonly do 
firms in your industry 
give irregular extra 
payments or bribes 




Peru 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.9 4.2
Philippines 2.8 3.4 2.7 4.8 3.0
Romania 2.5 3.3 3.7 3.2 4.1
Russia 2.5 3.6 3.7 4.0 3.8
Singapore 5.9 5.7 5.1 6.3 6.4
Slovenia 3.3 4.2 3.5 4.5 4.1
South Africa 3.8 3.9 3.1 5.6 4.4
Sri Lanka 2.6 3.5 2.7 4.1 4.3
Taiwan 4.3 5.1 3.9 3.6 5.6
Thailand 4.3 4 . 03 . 54 . 93 . 7
Trinidad and Tobago 4.1 4 . 02 . 74 . 84 . 2
Ukraine 2.1 3.9 2.1 2.5 2.9
Uruguay 2.9 3.8 3.6 5.4 4.4
Venezuela 2.2 3.1 2.6 3.9 3.5
Vietnam 3.1 4.0 3.0 3.7 3.5
Zimbabwe 1.4 3.3 1.9 4.1 2.5
Mean for these developing countries 3.1 3.6 3.0 4.3 3.9
Mean for the OECD economies 4.0 4.4 4.2 5.5 5.3
Source: The Global Competititiveness Report, 2001-2002. Interview responses to questions above by business people familiar with a given economy.
Notes:
number in italics
signifies the reported value is less than the average for those developing countries reported here
signifies the reported value is more than the average for the OECD countries surveyed  14
IV.  Assessments of public procurement reform in developing countries 
Much tends to be claimed for the benefits of procurement reforms. However, there is 
little analysis whether these benefits were realized after reform initiatives occurred. What 
follows is a brief assessment of some of the evidence mustered in support of these 
reforms. This is often anecdotal in nature and generally does not provide policymakers 
with a sense of the relative costs and benefits of different policy options. Frequently the 
evidence cannot withstand the rigorous scrutiny that should be applied to policy analyses. 
This should not be seen as an indictment of the available literature—rather as an 
opportunity which further analysis could rectify. 
Much is claimed in favor of the reform of public procurement practices, as the 
following rather typical statement about improvements in transparency makes clear: 
“Transparent procurement procedures can contribute to a more efficient 
allocation of resources through increased competition, higher quality 
procurement and budgetary savings for governments and thus for taxpayers. 
They can also help attract more investment by lowering risk. Objective and 
transparent procedures can in addition help enhance the efficiency of local 
suppliers as they compete for public contracts, thereby improving trade 
prospects by making these suppliers more competitive exporters…. Finally, 
transparent procurement procedures can help limit bribery and corruption, 
which are particularly rampant in the procurement field” (OECD 2003, page 
3). 
Or, to cite an EC submission to the WTO Working Party in the run up to the 
Cancun meeting in 2003, benefits of transparency include: 
"Efficiency and innovation: Public procurement applied in a transparent 
environment with a clear set of [predefined] rules defined [… ] may allow 
tendering companies from both developed and developing countries to foster 
enhanced competition thus stimulating innovation amongst bidders.  
Better value for money:  Transparent tendering should lead to effective 
competition by comparing offers from different bidders.  When tenders are to 
be opened to foreign bidders, the differences in terms of value and quality 
regularly brings prices down, as in any other auction system. Governments 
and public entities have a political duty to purchase goods, services and works 
through the most economically advantageous offer.  More transparency in 
procurement open to foreign suppliers contributes to increased competition 
and governments obtain lower prices, thereby reducing budget expenditure. 
Encouraging investment and partnership: Access to a foreign market when 
tenders are to be opened to foreign bidders, is always difficult, requiring, as it   15
does, previous market research, the setting-up of a distribution system, the 
opening of local branches and/or the appointing of representatives.  It is 
usually the case for foreign bidders wishing to win a public contract to set up 
a joint venture or similar partnership with local suppliers who are more 
familiar with domestic law, rules and procedures thus increasing the chances 
of success.  Transparency will increase investment and partnership. 
Reducing corruption:  Amongst the different forms of corruption affecting 
foreign trade (judicial corruption, political corruption), bribery (to officials 
and politicians) during the tendering process is one of the most significant 
and distorting of all corruption practices:  extra expenditure for public 
budgets ultimately borne by tax payers, reducing free competition and quality 
of deliverables, discouraging investment, etc. Publishing calls for tenders, 
notifying contract awards, including the successful bidder's name and final 
price, and making award criteria more transparent and accountable are some 
of the basic principles of transparency in government procurement which 
directly affect corruption practices." (EC submission to the WTO, 
WT/WGTGP/W/41, June 2003). 
 
Ideally, the evidence offered in support of such claims would trace through the changes in 
public procurement policies to some observable outcome and would take into account the 
other possible non-procurement related factors that might be at work. Much of the 
evidence actually offered does not meet this standard. Indeed, many of the arguments that 
are frequently put forth are in fact anecdotes about episodes of procurement reforms 
dressed up as quantitative evidence see, for example, Box 1. 
Box 1. Examples of cost-savings under transparent procurement systems 
•  Through the strengthening of transparency and procurement procedures including, for 
example, eliminating any tender specifications that favor a particular tender, 
Guatemala’s Ministry of Health reports savings of 43 percent on the purchase of 
medicines. 
•  The Colombian Ministry of Defense reports generating 47 percent savings in the 
procurement of military goods through improvement of transparency and 
procurement procedures. 
•  Nicaragua had been spending about 17 percent of its health budget on 
pharmaceuticals. High drug expenditure had resulted from a lack of pricing and drug 
information and non-transparent procurement procedures. With the establishment of a 
transparent procurement agency, accompanied by the effective implementation of an 
essential drug list, the government was able to reduce drug costs significantly. Within 
one year of introducing these measures, the government had reduced its 
pharmaceutical budget from $21 million in 1992 to $13 million in 1993.   16
•  In Pakistan, an open and transparent bidding process has resulted in savings of more 
than Rs 187 million (US $3.1m) for the Karachi Water and Sewerage Board. 
•  After introducing transparent procurement procedures in the energy sector, 
Bangladesh was able to reduce electricity prices to less than US $0.03 a kilowatt-
hour, roughly half the price of directly negotiated deals in Indonesia. 
Source: OECD (2003). 
On close inspection, the sources for the Bangladeshi, Columbian, Guatemalan, and 
Pakistani cases do not provide sufficient data to demonstrate the claims made.
15 The point 
here is not to criticize the authors of the OECD study; rather it is to make the point that if 
procurement reform is to be given a higher profile in national policymaking better studies 
of actual reform experiences are needed. 
Other information is more quantitative in nature and offers some circumstantial 
evidence that is suggestive of sizeable gains from procurement reforms. Using the OECD 
(2002a) data on the size of national procurement markets in 1998, one can calculate the 
dollar value of the savings that would result if procurement reforms yielded a 10 percent 
reduction in the prices paid by the government on its existing purchases. This gain can 
then be compared to the amount of aid a given country received in 1998, providing an 
“equivalent” percentage increase in aid that would free up the same amount of resources 
as the procurement reform specified above. This calculation provides a sense of how 
large self-help (that is, domestic procurement reform) compares to current levels of 
assistance from abroad.  
For 39 of the 106 developing countries in the OECD (2002a) study data on aid 
receipts is reported in World Development Indicators Online. Figure 2 plots the 
cumulative distribution of the aid “equivalent” of a 10 percent reduction in state 
expenditures brought about by a potential procurement reform. The findings are quite 
striking: in all but two developing countries the expansion in aid that would free up as 
much resources as the stated procurement reform was over 25 percent. In over half the 
sample of 39 developing countries, the equivalent aid expansion was over 50 percent. In 
                                                 
15 The study supporting the claims made about Nicaraguan pharmaceuticals is not on the internet, and 
therefore is not easily verifiable. Even if it were available, one would want to know how much of the 
reported reduction in drug costs was due to implementing a transparent procurement agency and how much 
due to implementing an “essential” drugs list. The effects of one should not be conflated with the other.   17
short, these calculations (for that is all they are) suggest that the benefits of a modest 
procurement reform could be sizeable compared to one frequently discussed source of 
funding for development; namely, aid. Of course, the critical word in the last sentence is 
“suggest” as the calculations above do not demonstrate that procurement reforms will 
generate a 10 percent reduction in the prices paid by the states; nor do they shed any light 
on what needs to be reformed and how. Nevertheless, by giving some sense of the 
relevant magnitudes, such calculations may be more credible than the anecdotes often 
reported in official reports, academic publications, and the like. 
Figure 2: What percentage of aid received would a 10 percent 
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Another type of evidence that is suggestive of the benefits of procurement reform 
focuses on a positive change in some procurement-related outcome that follows the 
implementation of a reform. An example of this type of evidence is found in Lemke’s 
(2003) account of Polish experience after a new Public Procurement Law came into force 
on 1 January 1995. This law mandated the announcement of certain state contracts in a 
newly created Bulletin of Public Procurement, which is now distributed to potential 
bidders in paper and in electronic form. Table 5 reports for the years 1996-2001 the 
number of announcements in this Bulletin and the average number of offers made by 
contractors for each announcement. The fact that the number of offers rises over time 
(from 3.64 in 1996 to 5.50 in the first half of 2001) might be thought to support the   18
hypothesis that the increased transparency (the publication of announcements) resulted in 
more bidders for state contracts. Unfortunately, to conclude this one needs to know that 
some other factor was not responsible for the increased propensity to bid for state 
contracts. For example, overall economic reforms could have resulted in an across-the-
board increase in the number of firms competing in the state procurement market, 
including trade liberalization resulting in greater imports. 
 
 
Table 5: Bidders for Polish government procurement contracts, 1996-2001 
Item  1996 1997  1998 1999  2000  2001  (first 
half only) 
Number of announcements in the Bulletin of 
Public Procurement 
34136 44657  53147 55262  70234  37983 
Value of contracts announced in the Bulletin 
of Public Procurement, (US $ billion) 
 13.6  17.5  17.7  23.0 11.1 
Mean number of offers for each 
announcement (that resulted in the selection of 
an offer.)* 
3.64 4.16  4.70 5.40  5.15  5.50 
Note: * Approximately 20 percent of announced procurements were “invalidated” 
Source: Lemke (2003, page 119). 
 
Moreover, this evidence alone cannot explain why the average number of bidders 
for services and supplies contracts fell after 1999—even though the additional 
transparency brought about by the publication is presumably unchanged (or possibly 
enhanced if the published announcements became more precise over time.) Furthermore, 
even if the hypothesis is to be believed, this evidence does not reveal by what percentage 
(if at all) the prices paid by the state fell as a result of more firms bidding for public 
contracts. Without such estimates of the resulting savings one cannot compare these 
benefits with the costs of publishing announcements about procurement opportunities and 
the costs of verifying their accuracy. To reiterate: the objective of the foregoing 
discussion is not to criticize any one study or attempt at procurement reform. Rather it is 
to point out that the available empirical evidence is unsatisfactory for policymaking 
purposes, and also to indicate what types of questions on procurement practices in 
developing countries need to be addressed. 
The available literature is a stronger on the factors that impede national reform 
initiatives on public procurement. For the most part, this strand of literature makes no   19
claims to be quantitative and so the concerns raised in previous paragraphs do not arise. 
The first theme of such literature is that developing countries differ markedly in their 
starting points for procurement reforms (Hunja, 2003), and this can have a considerable 
bearing on the types and strength of the prevailing vested interests. The transition 
economies, for example, have had to create from scratch procedures for purchasing from 
their (often recently developed) private sectors. Other developing countries—with longer 
traditions of private sector involvement in their economies—have attempted to modernize 
their procurement practices. The legacy of the past plays a different role in yet another 
group of developing countries: those former colonies that inherited procurement regimes 
from their respective former rules and that now seek to update and revise these practices. 
Differences in initial conditions also interact with competing influences and 
pressures to shape the reform process, if any. Typically, domestic initiatives are 
influenced by international standards (such as the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Procurement). External partners and membership of regional trading agreements played 
an important role in the reforms to the procurement legislation and practice in many 
Eastern European nations (Hupkes, 1997). This experience raises the general question of 
whether international guidelines on procurement or regional procurement rules are 
appropriate for the development needs of low and middle-income countries.
16 This has a 
direct bearing to the debate on the merits of WTO disciplines and on the need for further 
research—points developed in the two following sections. 
Turning to the success or otherwise of procurement reform initiatives in 
developing countries, the experience has been decidedly mixed. Hunja (2003) identifies 
three major impediments to successful reform: (i) deeply vested interests and the lack of 
political will to overcome them; (ii) paucity of technical knowledge and capacity; and 
(iii) the complexity of the substantive issues involved. Faced with these obstacles, some 
have argued that a necessary condition for reform is strong support from senior political 
leaders. Others have stressed noted the role that across-the-board, rather than 
procurement-specific, measures to improve governance can play. The former can 
                                                 
16 For a stimulating contribution on this matter see Schooner and Yulkins (2003).   20
introduce improvements to procurement indirectly as they do not single out specific 
entities or procurement officials for special attention (Rose Ackerman 1999).  
As noted in Table 1, there is a modest but growing literature on national 
experience with procurement practices and reforms. Such literature is undoubtedly 
important in establishing the factual record and relevant institutional set up. However, 
there has been little attempt to synthesize the lessons learned for policymakers in other 
developing countries. The fact that the few illuminating cross-country synthesis papers do 
not motivate their analyses or their recommendations with explicit references to national 
experience is telling.
17 
Technological developments have added a new dimension to potential 
procurement reforms in both developing and industrial economies. The combination of 
greater computing power and cheaper internet-based communication has given rise to so-
called e-procurement or electronic procurement regimes. It is an open question how and 
to what extent state procuring entities can reap the benefits from recent innovations 
(Segal and Taylor 2001)—much will depend on the extent of the “digital divide” and the 
quality and cost of the underlying telecom infrastructure in a country. E-procurement 
offers the promise of cutting costs and simplifying administrative procedures, especially 
for repetitive transactions and relatively homogeneous products. Promising and 
innovative mechanisms that revolve around e-procurement have been implemented in 
countries such as Brazil (Ozorio de Almeida, 2004). In this Brazilian case it has 
reportedly led to significant cost savings and an increase in the transparency and 
accountability of government bodies. Moreover, E-procurement can support better 
statistical reporting, enhanced transparency, and bulk buying (Wiseman 2000). However, 
implementing these innovations will entail costs (infrastructure, training, etc.) Depending 
on country circumstances it may also require complementary reforms—e.g., 
telecommunications regulation, privatization, etc. Concerns have also been raised about 
privacy and the protection of confidential business information, and the capacity to store 
data over long time periods. All of these issues are wide open for further research and 
analysis. 
                                                 
17 In his analysis of the measures taken to reduce corruption in procurement regimes, Anechiarico (2003) 
does. Unfortunately, this analysis only applies to selected OECD member states.   21
In sum, it is not much of an exaggeration to argue that the literature on 
procurement reform in developing countries is in an embryonic state. The qualitative 
literature is very useful in describing reform initiatives and existing laws and practices, 
but tends to be country-specific. Much more needs to be documented before convincing 
general (that is, cross-country) lessons are likely to emerge. The current quantitative 
literature is at best suggestive of the benefits of procurement reforms, but would not pass 
serious scrutiny or convince a skeptic of the benefits of reform. Finally, the literature has 
only begun to address some of the newer challenges in state contracting such as 
electronic procurement and pressures to comply with external international rules on 
procurement practice (contained in regional trading agreements and existing WTO rules.) 
V.  Enhancing transparency in public procurement 
Remedying the deficiencies identified above requires a substantial increase in our 
knowledge of state procurement policies and associated reforms. Research can play a part 
to improve outcomes, as can further efforts by governments to cooperate through 
exchanging information and sharing experiences on the efficiency and efficacy of 
different types of procurement practices. What follows is a description of a research 
program that would considerably add to the evidentiary base, and a discussion of some 
options for international voluntary cooperation to enhance transparency. Both could be 
pursued in a WTO context as a modality of continuing interchange between countries on 
the topic of procurement. These two elements are mutually reinforcing as the research 
program would help improve understanding of the role, if any, that “hard” international 
rules can play in encouraging the reform of state procurement practices in developing 
countries, and voluntary cooperation would facilitate the exchange of information and the 
adoption of best practices.  
A policy-relevant research agenda on public procurement 
The development-oriented research needed in this area has many elements, ranging from 
institutional and data-collection matters to rigorous empirical analyses of actual practices 
and the impacts of policy reforms. The following nine priority areas can be identified:   22
1.  First, a comprehensive list should be assembled of what policy instruments fall under 
the label of “public procurement policies.” This may seem rather obvious to 
procurement experts, but to more generalist policymakers it would be helpful to 
clarify which governmental measures are part of public procurement policy, which 
measures are not, and which state agencies (in central government, in local 
government, and in the directly state-run industries) are supposed to implement these 
policies. This analysis would also be useful in delineating the scope of public 
procurement reform (by identifying the policy instruments that might altered) as well 
as providing a clear basis upon which to compare the essential features of national 
procurement regimes; a point developed in 2. below. 
2.  Second, for as many developing countries as possible, a publicly-accessible 
compendium should be assembled of their public procurement laws, major pieces of 
implementing regulations and associated documents, and agencies responsible for 
administering the relevant laws. This compendium would also include key features of 
national procurement regulations—such as thresholds for state contracts above which 
competitive tendering must be used. Furthermore, the nature (if any) of any 
administrative or judicial oversight would be specified. Such a compendium would 
facilitate legitimate cross-country comparisons about the key aspects of national 
procurement law and its implementation. 
3.  Drawing upon the experiences of selected developing countries, detailed descriptions 
and analysis of the manner in which national public procurement systems fit into the 
overall public expenditure and financial management systems should be undertaken. 
Strong and effective financial control and accountability systems may allow for 
simpler procurement systems if incentives are created for efficient purchasing 
practices by government entities, perhaps making detailed “command and control” 
process guidelines/requirements redundant. Relatedly, it would be useful to evaluate 
the hypothesis that the greater the extent to which public entities operate in a 
competitive environment and are subject to hard budget constraints, the less 
inefficient are their purchasing decisions.   23
4.  Guidelines for good practices in the design of laws and implementation methods 
should be devised, and should include assessments of the specific procedures that are 
applied in different countries and mappings from existing guidelines to those 
recommended by major international organizations, such as the World Bank and 
UNICITRAL. This type of analysis should identify the important and desirable 
features of laws and procurement processes—including, for example, the reliance on 
standards and norms that apply to procedures along the lines that were developed for 
construction procurement in South Africa (see Watermeyer, 2004a, b). Related to this, 
a critical assessment of the costs and benefits of existing guidelines that are applied 
by institutions, such as the major development banks, would be very useful. What do 
these guidelines actually achieve? Are they outdated given the rise of the Internet and 
the potential for government to business portals to introduce market forces into the 
procurement process through real-time reverse auctions and the like? 
5.  The factual record on outcomes from procurement regimes in developing countries 
(including the number of contracts put out to tender, indicators of the use of selective 
or limited tendering, the use of preference margins in contracts, the number of firms 
submitting bids for a contract, the propensity to award a contract to the lowest bidder, 
and the propensity to source from abroad or from domestically favored groups) 
should be assembled. Of course, countries differ markedly in the amount of data that 
they collect and make available publicly, but with the growing use of computers in 
procurement systems, more developing countries are assembling such data. Subject to 
any concerns about confidentiality and the like, bringing these data together would 
facilitate policy analysis. Data on the observed outcomes from state procurement 
could be complemented by information obtained from surveys of business people and 
others’ perceptions of the “fairness” or otherwise of national procurement systems. 
6.  Given the role that discriminating between suppliers for state contracts plays in many 
nations’ procurement regimes, more research is needed that identifies the costs and 
benefits of such discrimination, especially as it relates to set-aside policies and to 
international trade. At present opinion is divided as to the merits of such 
discrimination. A balanced analysis and account of the pros and cons of such 
measures that draws upon available empirical research would help both policymakers   24
and policy analysts. Another important question to be addressed is what are the most 
efficient ways of attaining industrial policy and equity objectives and whether public 
procurement is the appropriate (first best) tool available.  
7.  Quantitative studies on the effects of individual reform episodes in developing 
countries should be commissioned. After characterizing the legal and institutional 
nature of the reform in question, empirical analysis needs to centre on the 
consequences of reform. For example, to what extent does the publication of tenders 
increase the number of firms willing to bid for state contracts, taking into account the 
other factors that might determine the propensity to bid? The goal here would be to 
quantify the likely effect of a reform measure. Where possible, data on the fiscal 
outlays associated with the reform and data on any resulting fiscal savings would be 
presented. Ideally, at least one study should focus on a significant reform whose goal 
was to improve transparency, another on the effects of reducing preferences when 
evaluating bids, another on the procurement of goods and services that the poor are 
highly dependent on, and one on the strengthening the rights of firms to challenge the 
decisions of procurement officials. It should be stressed that the focus here would be 
on the quantitative impact of reforms, not on the political economy (see topic of 9. 
below). 
8.  Drawing again on experience in developing countries, a series of studies on the 
linkages between procurement policies and other government policies would enhance 
our understanding of the connections between the procurement reforms and other 
directly governance-related matters. Such studies would examine the links between 
procurement and corruption; the implications of the growing number of prosecutions 
of bid-rigging cases in developing countries; and the role and relative merits of 
regional trading agreements, international trade agreements, and international norms 
(such as the UNCITRAL Model Law) in shaping procurement reform. Given the 
focus on transparency in discussions at the WTO, the linkages between transparency-
related reforms and practices and corruption should be considered explicitly. 
9.  Finally, country-studies (or sub-national studies) of the impediments to procurement 
reforms and the political-economy strategies that have been deployed to overcome   25
those obstacles would be very useful. Research on this front would explicitly 
recognize the opposition to reform and investigate what strategies were used to 
mitigate, ameliorate, or circumvent that opposition—including participation in 
international agreements, including trade agreements that cover procurement. An 
important question here is whether these strategies have more general application. 
International Cooperation on Procurement: The WTO and Transparency 
In principle, international cooperation can help improve public procurement by providing 
focal points for good practice and a mechanism through which governments can make 
binding commitments to pursue certain practices. Historically, cooperation on regulatory 
areas has tended to be voluntary—so-called ‘soft law’—in that any agreed norms were 
not legally binding on signatories. Examples of specialized institutions that have been 
created to address specific issues abound, including the International Labour Office, the 
International Telecommunications Union, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, the Bank for International Settlements, and the World Customs 
Organization (Hoekman, 2004a). Such bodies develop consensus standards on technical 
issues that members agree constitute good practice, but participation and implementation 
is left to individual decisions by countries. Here there is generally limited scope for 
making implementation mandatory, and in most cases no mechanism to enforce norms 
through binding dispute settlement. This is a major difference with recent multilateral 
trade agreements, where disciplines are binding and subject to binding dispute settlement.  
The focus in the WTO has traditionally been on market access. Public procurement 
is not subject to the GATT discipline of national treatment—members are therefore free 
to discriminate against foreign firms if they desire to do so. The same is true of 
services—the GATS excludes services procurement (Art. XIII). Only signatories to the 
plurilateral GPA are subject to a variety of disciplines, for both goods and services 
procurement, including national treatment, MFN, transparency-related provisions, and 
dispute settlement.
18 Most developing countries have not signed the GPA, for reasons that 
will not be explored here.
19 One result of this resistance to joining the GPA was a shift in 
strategy on the part of several industrialized countries—turning away from an explicit 
                                                 
18 Coverage of services is a function of the GATS commitments that GPA members have made.  
19 For a discussion of this matter, see Hoekman and Mavroidis (1997).   26
market access focus towards pushing for rules for greater transparency in government 
procurement.
  Although negotiations on transparency in government procurement 
practices will be kept off the table for the duration of the Doha round, the associated 
issues are unlikely to go away, if only because many proposed bilateral and regional trade 
agreements contain disciplines on these matters. 
The Chairman of the WTO Working Group on Transparency in Government 
Procurement Practices, established after the Singapore Ministerial, identified the 
following twelve issues around which discussions on procurement matters at the WTO 
have been organized: 
•  definition and scope of government procurement; 
•  procurement methods; 
•  publication of information on national legislation and procedures;  
•  information on procurement opportunities, tendering and qualification criteria; 
•  time-periods; 
•  transparency on decisions on qualification; 
•  transparency on decisions on contract awards; 
•  domestic review procedures; 
•  other matters related to transparency; 
•  information to be provided to other governments (notification); 
•  WTO dispute settlement procedures; and 
•  technical co-operation and special and differential treatment for developing 
countries.
20 
The proponents of more multilateral rules on transparency in government 
procurement include the European Communities and its Member States, the United 
States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Canada. Skeptics have included Hong Kong 
(China), India, and Malaysia. The published minutes of the Working Group record 
significant disagreements on almost each and every point, with little evidence of a 
convergence in views across a wide range of matters (Evenett 2003). For example, the 
following extract from the minutes of the 29 May 2002 meeting of the Working Group 
highlights the divergence of view as to the coverage of any general disciplines on 
transparency in government procurement: 
“The representative of the European Community, joined by the 
representative of the United States, said that, in the absence of lists of 
covered entities which provided certainty about the scope and coverage of 
                                                 
20 Successive chairmen of this Working Group have issued and updated a document titled “List Of The 
Issues Raised and Points Made,” from which the above 12 bullet points have been extracted.   27
rules, a definition of government procurement was especially important in 
a transparency agreement.  His delegation considered that, although the 
contours of a definition remained a matter for further discussion, any 
definition which was eventually arrived at should be as broad as most 
Members could agree to.  The representative of India, joined by the 
representative of Malaysia, said that a wide divergence remained in the 
Group on the question of definition.  The study phase should be used for a 
better understanding of the various issues related to definition.  This issue 
should be resolved through discussions in the Working Group rather than 
through negotiations” (WTO 2002, page 5-6). 
The matter of coverage, including potentially services and works, is important as it 
raises the question as to whether WTO disciplines should regulate domestic policies in 
ways that go well beyond market access considerations. If a broad approach to coverage 
were taken—i.e., general transparency disciplines applying to all procurement of goods 
and services, whether or not domestic policies imply that foreign firms have access—this 
would extend the reach of the WTO further ‘behind the border’.  
Moreover, a broad definition of coverage could have precedent-setting effects in 
the more general debate on where to draw the boundaries of the WTO. A broad approach 
to coverage for procurement might allow a case to be made for transparency disciplines 
in other policy areas—labor, environment, health, education, taxation, etc.
21 Whether this 
is desirable depends on the preferences of members regarding the value (payoff) of 
extending the reach of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as well as the 
effectiveness and capacity of the WTO to develop and enforce transparency disciplines. 
On the latter point, it is worth noting that the DSU is likely to be more effective if there 
are substantial “export” interests that perceive it is worth their while bringing potential 
cases to the attention of their home governments. In the case of transparency in 
government procurement, however, a proiri reasoning suggests that there will be few 
negative spillovers imposed on foreign firms from non-compliance with negotiated 
disciplines (Evenett and Hoekman 2005). Instead, domestic stakeholders will have the 
                                                 
21 If members were to move down this path, the WTO acronym might come to stand for World 
Transparency Organization. It would appear there was some support within the European Commission for 
moving in this direction. For example, the former EC Commissioner for trade, Pascal Lamy, called for an 
effort to build a “broad coalition of interests" in support of an "explicit anti-corruption agenda in the 
WTO.” See “EU wants WTO to tackle corruption,” Financial Times January 9, 2004.   28
greatest incentives to contest violations—suggesting domestic enforcement mechanisms 
will be important for effective enforcement. 
Beyond Transparency…or is transparency enough? 
Many of the arguments in favor of general transparency disciplines in the WTO revolve 
around public governance objectives, in particular reducing the scope for bribery and 
corruption.
22 A potential benefit arising from transparency and accountability provisions 
is that they may constrain rent-seeking activities.
23 Although the issue of corruption 
extends beyond procurement, rent seeking in the public purchasing context is particularly 
prominent because considerable amounts of money involved are often involved. Case 
studies have demonstrated the cost of corruption to be high, leading to excess costs per 
project in the 25-50 percent range (Wade, 1982; Rose-Ackerman, 1995a). The result of 
corruption and rent-seeking is a reduction in the economy's growth performance as the 
most efficient, conforming (qualified) suppliers are not allocated contracts, resource 
allocation is distorted, and governments impose excess tax burdens or more commonly, 
pursue deficit/monetary financing (Mauro, 1995; Bardhan, 1997).  
    Abstracting from differences in cultural norms across countries, effective anti-
corruption strategies must reduce the magnitude of the benefits that can be granted by 
officials, increase the costs of bribery for the private sector, and limit the market power of 
officials (Rose-Ackerman, 1995 a,b; Bardhan, 1997). Transparency has a role to play but 
by itself is not sufficient. If the objective is a reduction in corruption, action needs to go 
further. Of the various strategies and suggestions made in the literature, the following are 
particularly relevant for procurement: effective deterrents through ex post punishments 
that exceed the gains realized (including banning firms caught in attempts to engage in 
bribery from bidding for contracts for a number of years); the creation of external 
monitoring devices and institutions (including encouragement and protection of "whistle 
blowers"); public transparency-enhancing mechanisms (published audits by independent 
auditors; a free press); privatization and hard budget constraints; requirements to 
encourage the use of standardized products and/or goods that have well-established 
market positions; and use of general retail/wholesale market prices for goods similar to 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Arrowsmith (1998) and OECD (2002b). 
23 What follows develops some of the arguments initially made in Hoekman (1998).   29
those to be procured as comparators. In sum, transparency reforms will almost certainly 
have to be complemented by a variety of other actions and policies. 
    Moreover, to be effective transparency norms need to be enforceable. Of 
particular importance here are domestic challenge procedures and the costs and benefits 
of multilateral dispute settlement. To be effective, domestic challenge mechanisms need 
to provide firms with an opportunity to protest before the procurement process is 
completed, as well as thereafter (Alam, 1995). In the procurement context, the set of 
losers is usually small. In discretionary, non-transparent procurement systems losing 
firms have little incentive to protest against irregularities because of the power of 
procuring entities to black list them. In general, given the sunk costs of participation in 
the bidding process there is only an incentive to protest if expected returns outweigh 
expected costs of protesting. In the absence of effective compensation, and thus limited 
returns to, and incentives for, individuals bringing cases, there may be a need for public 
action to enforce norms and penalties that are strong enough to be of deterrent value. An 
ombudsman, an activist and free press, and surveys of the type discussed in section IV 
above, are all potential complementary mechanisms to ensure accountability. 
    The foregoing discussion suggests that procurement reform ought not to be 
limited to improving transparency—there is a plethora of complementary actions that will 
generally be needed on the part of governments and stakeholders. In short, from a 
development perspective, it is probably necessary to go beyond improving transparency 
alone. But this poses something of a problem in the context of trade negotiations where 
the natural extension of any negotiations is precisely what many WTO members are 
opposed to. If progress, therefore, is unlikely at the WTO, what alternatives exist for 
international cooperation on procurement reform?  
 
Voluntary cooperation: ‘soft law’ as a first step (or an end point) 
Given the uncertainty regarding the returns to multilateral rule making, one alternative 
way forward might be to explore the scope for more extensive voluntary cooperation 
between nations.
24 One option could involve the creation of a mechanism through which 
                                                 
24 It would incorrect to suggest that voluntary cooperation and norm formation in the area of government 
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countries exchange information on procurement policies, reforms, and their effectiveness 
on a voluntary basis. Such an approach would have several possible payoffs: (i) increased 
awareness of what has worked elsewhere (for example, as what types of complementary 
reforms may be needed, etc.); (ii) increased accountability of governments to their 
citizens; and (iii) to identify where there are significant cross border spillovers from 
policies that could justify the negotiation of international rules. Increased transparency, 
involving monitoring of what governments actually do, could also help mobilize support 
from domestic constituencies for reforms. Such monitoring or review activities should 
extend to the effectiveness of procurement policies in attaining the industrial 
development and equity-related objectives that are often spelt out in procurement 
legislation. 
  There are many options that can be pursued in implementing voluntary 
cooperation and greater transparency of procurement performance. One model is the 
Global Forum on Competition that is organized periodically by the OECD. This forum 
brings together competition law enforcement officials and interested officials from 
government ministries from OECD and non-OECD countries to share information, learn 
from national experiences, and identify good practice. The Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Forum (APEC) provides another model along these lines that extends to 
trade and finance officials, with links to technical expertise and financial resources. The 
International Competition Network is another example, which differs from OECD and 
APEC in that the cooperation involves primarily competition stakeholders (enforcers, 
private practitioners), and is not inter-governmental. Here also the focus is on a 
cooperative effort to improve national policies and converge, where appropriate, on 
common standards that are applied on a voluntary basis.
25  
  Another possibility for “soft” cooperation would be a multilateral monitoring 
effort. The World Bank and its partners in the wider donor community have invested 
                                                                                                                                                   
Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction, and Services. An overview of that 
Model Law, including a comparison to the obligations of the current GPA, can be found in Evenett (2003). 
Another type of prominent international initiative on government procurement involves including 
provisions on procurement matters in preferential trading agreements. The latter are discussed in OECD 
(2002) and Evenett (2003). 
25 See Chayes and Chayes (1995), Abbott and Snidal (2000) and Sabel and Reddy (2002) for discussions of 
soft law in international relations, and Abbott (2001) for an analysis of international efforts to address 
corruption using this approach.    31
substantial resources in assessing the performance and quality of public procurement 
systems in many borrower countries. The principal instrument in question is the Country 
Procurement Assessment Report (CPAR) – discussed briefly above. CPARs have 
contributed to enactment of better legal frameworks and developing new institutions to 
manage procurement. They could be used as an input or model for an international 
collaborative effort by governments to monitor their performance on the procurement 
front, if they are complemented by a focus on impact assessment and the collection of 
some of the information that is already required on the part of current GPA members 
(e.g., the share of procurement that is below a minimum threshold value and the share of 
contracts that are awarded directly without competitive bidding). 
The advantages and disadvantages of this type of voluntary cooperation are well 
known.
26 A plus is that the pace with which countries adopt policies that conform to 
recommended principles can vary. The ‘learning’ or ‘focal point’ models that underlie 
voluntary cooperation help ensure that, when implemented, policy changes are more 
likely to have national ownership – i.e., there are constituencies that support adoption or 
changes in existing practices. A downside of the voluntary approach is that insofar as 
there is political economy resistance to adopting national welfare-enhancing reforms, it 
may not happen in the first place. The same is true of policies that create negative 
spillovers – the incentives for countries to take the interests of partner countries into 
account will be weak.  
In the case of procurement the weakness of the evidentiary base is such that it is 
hard to tell just how important these potential downsides are. As noted earlier, the adverse 
knock-on effects felt by foreigners of suboptimal procurement regimes in developing 
countries is likely to be limited, due to the small size of those countries' state budgets. In 
which case, the primary rationale for them to engage in international cooperation will be 
national; that is, improving domestic policies and performance. Even if this is not the 
case, a voluntary approach to specific issues that includes explicit analysis and 
assessment of policies will help generate information on the size and distribution of the 
costs and benefits of the status quo, as well as the likely net payoffs from reform. It 
                                                 
26 See Hoekman (2004b) for more detailed discussion of soft law options in the WTO.   32
should also reduce the uncertainty regarding the possible repercussions of subsequently 
signing binding commitments. 
  Information and analysis are important inputs into a well-functioning trading 
order. Greater monitoring and assessment of the impacts of policies would allow more 
informed and proactive engagement by civil society (think tanks, nongovernmental 
organizations, consumers and taxpayers) in the policy formation and negotiation process. 
If more is done to determine on an objective basis the effects of prevailing policies, in 
particular whether they are achieving stated national objectives and whether they are 
harming foreign commercial interests in doing so, then the case for further international 
rules on public procurement will become clearer.  
VI. Concluding  remarks 
Efficiency in government procurement is of importance in ensuring that the best value for 
money is obtained by public entities. Procurement practices also figure prominently in the 
way that many potential investors and civil society view a country. Ensuring transparency 
of the procurement process is an important determinant of efficiency insofar as it 
enhances the contestability of public procurement markets (by giving all qualified 
potential suppliers a chance to bid). If procurement procedures are opaque and 
discretionary, the incentive for firms to enter into a market are typically reduced. The 
same problem arises if it is possible for firms to obtain “preferred status” through bribery 
of officials and potential entrants do not know how to “play by the rules of the game”. 
    Many developing countries have adopted procurement legislation and regulations 
that require public entities to source goods and services through an open and competitive 
process. To what extent actual practice is consistent with the formal rules and principles 
is often difficult to determine, in part because the incentives to contest violations of the 
formal rules of the game are often small.  
    A WTO agreement could provide an international mechanism through which 
governments credibly commit themselves to transparent procurement regimes. 
  Whether this makes sense for individual developing countries is something that will need 
to be determined empirically and on a case-by-case basis. Prior discussions in the WTO 
Working Group on Transparency of Government Procurement Practices have revealed 
that many governments have doubts that there is much to be gained from further binding   33
multilateral rules. Many are also concerned about the possible downside risks in terms of 
implementation costs and the implications of extending the DSU to procurement. There is 
also a systemic question insofar as the objective is limited to transparency only. Whether 
binding (enforceable) rules should extend to cover all procurement or only that share 
which is internationally contestable under existing national law is another related 
question. 
    Decisions on whether or not to extend the WTO rules to cover more elements of 
public procurement should be based, in part, on data and analysis. More information on 
both policy and outcomes in developing countries is a critical starting point towards 
identifying the scope and payoffs to binding international rules. The extant literature is 
rather limited and does not provide enough information to help policymakers identify 
how best to deal with procurement challenges. Development-focused research that 
considers the institutional environment that prevails in developing countries and links 
procurement concerns to the broader development agenda (priorities), complemented by a 
mechanism that encourages the exchange of information on outcomes and alternative 
policy options, could contribute towards more informed decision-making. A voluntary 
‘soft law’ type of multilateral cooperation that aims to enhance the understanding of both 
applied policies and outcomes in developing countries could do much to mobilize the 
support needed for procurement reform. Such a process would also help identify the 
appropriate complementary policies that are needed to make such reforms work.  
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Ivory Coast 16.76% 4.32% 20.39% 7.96% 11.10
Egypt 9.45% 82.71
Ghana 11.88% 7.17





Mauritius 11.73% 3.23% 11.37% 3.07% 4.20
Morocco 16.59% 36.12
Mozambique 20.18% 3.82
Namibia 29.33% 9.89% 35.78% 16.34% 3.00
Niger 17.24% 2.01




Seychelles 28.75%   24.98% 0.56
Sierra Leone 7.56% 0.65
South Africa 19.74% 21.77% 116.73
Swaziland 20.80% 1.18
Uganda 9.10% 6.06
Tanzania 8.29%   6.74% 8.09




Bahamas 14.06% 3.42% 13.47% 3.27% 14.62% 3.98% 3.83% 4.12
Barbados 19.75% 2.33
Belize 19.47% 18.24%   0.67
Bermuda 12.70% 12.48% 2.31
Bolivia  12.45% 1.84% 7.96
Brazil 16.46% 7.21% 776.94
Cayman Island 14.67% 0.93
Chile 9.54% 11.51%   74.32
Colombia 10.27% 1.55% 9.06% 1.02% 13.48% 4.75% 4.19% 90.41
Costa Rica 16.75% 18.36% 10.42
Dominica 20.16% 0.25
Dominican Rep. 4.23% 16.04
Ecuador 9.33% 4.21% 8.05% 3.63% 13.23% 8.11% 7.53% 19.30
El Salvador 9.74% 11.14% 11.86
French Guiana 34.54% 48.75% 1.50
Greneda 19.73% 0.31
Guadeloupe 30.35% 39.25% 3.50
Guatemala 6.34% 8.37% 19.01
Guyana 13.04% 0.74
Honduras 11.12%   5.34
 Jamaica 7.56% 7.06
Martinique 28.75% 36.19% 4.38
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Peru 7.94% 9.87%   64.06
Puerto Rico 14.12% 50.51
Suriname 26.27% 0.82
Trinidad‐Tobago 16.44% 2.59% 6.14
Uruguay 13.70% 20.95
Venezuela 8.60% 2.31% 10.28% 4.00%   95.02
 Asia
Azerbaijan 19.86% 4.24% 11.73% 2.11% 4.10
Bahrain 26.07% 5.35
Bangladesh 13.95% 12.53% 41.42
Bhutan 21.58% 0.36
China 12.84% 960.79
Cyprus 17.81% 13.49% 8.88
Fiji 17.44% 2.33
Hong Kong, China 8.69% 2.49% 11.00% 4.81% 166.45
India 10.54% 3.44% 7.42% 1.74% 13.29% 6.18% 4.46% 420.31
Indonesia 9.20% 215.00
Iran 11.06% 2.63% 8.00% 1.90% 187.42
Iraq 30.82% 4.60
Israel 25.95% 10.01% 91.32
Jordan 23.74% 7.45
Kuwait 37.30% 26.45
Kyrgyzstan 20.04% 11.74% 21.60% 12.88% 1.87





Pakistan 12.87% 6.61% 16.29% 10.03% 64.13
Papua New Guinea 23.24% 3.71




Sri Lanka 13.17% 5.57% 10.03% 4.24% 17.42% 9.82% 8.48% 15.70
Syrian Arab R. 14.34% 64.93
Thailand 9.67% 3.08% 17.31% 10.72% 117.04
United Arab Emirates 17.01% 47.23
Uzbekistan 22.71% 14.19





Belarus 19.15% 10.54% 10.54% 5.62% 21.27% 12.65% 7.74% 14.28
Bulgaria 8.08% 12.06
Estonia 16.62% 8.06% 15.96% 7.75% 21.05% 12.50% 12.18% 5.11
Latvia 14.70% 7.79% 17.09% 10.18% 6.19
Lithuania 15.68% 10.69
Malta 17.56% 4.24% 15.20% 3.67% 21.87% 8.55% 7.99% 3.99
Romania 13.77% 8.49% 41.70
Russia 17.39% 12.70% 283.82
Slovenia 19.62% 19.99
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Appendix 2.  World Bank Country Procurement Assessment Reports. 
 
Documents can be found at :http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDS_IBank_Servlet?ptype=advSrch&psz=20&pcont=results&dt=540617  
 
Country  Date of report.  Report number. 
1.  Algeria. 01.06.2003  29765 
2.  Armenia. 01.05.2004  29246 
3.  Azerbaijan. 01.06.2003  26778 
4.  Bangladesh. 11.05.2002  24144 
5.  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  30.06.2002  24396 
6.  Brazil. 01.03.2004  28446 
7.  Cambodia. 14.09.2004  29950 
8.  Chile. 01.08.2004  28914 
9.  Colombia 28/07/2005  33260 
10. Cote d' Ivoire.  10.06.2004  29635 (2 volumes) 
11. Dominica. 01.06.2003  30975  (2  volumes) 
12. Ethiopia. 28.06.2002  29057  (2  volumes) 
13. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.  25.06.2002  28801 
14. Georgia. 30.06.2002  26660 
15. Ghana. 01.06.2004  29055 
16. Ghana. 01.06.2003  29055  (5  volumes) 
17. Guinea. 25.06.2002  26406 
18. Honduras February  2005  32791 
19. India. 10.12.2003  27859 
20. Indonesia. 27.03.2001  21823 
21. Laos. 01.10.2003  25334 
22. Malawi. 24.05.2004  29295  (3  volumes) 
23. Moldova. 01.06.2003  27548 
24. Mongolia. 12.09.2003  26985 
25. Nepal. 11.04.2002  23917 
26. Paraguay. 01.31.2003  25908 
27. South Africa.  28.02.2003  25751 
28. Tanzania. 30.04.2004  26241 
29. Tanzania. 07.09.1996  27940 
30. Timor Leste.  23.05.2004  28552 
31. Tonga. 01.06.2003  27342 
32. Uganda. 15.06.2004  32499  (3  volumes) 
33. Uzbekistan. 28.02.2003  25653 
 